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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PEACEFUL PICKETING BY MINORITY UNION PROTECTED
BY THE NLRA
NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc., Local Union No. 639
362 U.S. 274 (1960)
In 1955, Curtis Bros., Inc., a retail furniture store in Washington,
D. C., employed 29 drivers, helpers, warehousemen and furniture finishers
whose exclusive representative was Teamsters Local 639. Upon petition of
the employer, the National Labor Relations Board [hereafter, NLRB],
conducted an election among these employees which resulted in a vote of 28
to 1 against union representation. Following this election, the ousted Local
maintained 2 orderly pickets at the customers' entrance to the store carry-
ing placards urging the employees to join the union. Curtis Bros. filed a
complaint with the NLRB charging that the picketing was an unfair labor
practice under § 8(b)(1) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act.'
The basis of the charge was that the activity was "recognitional" picketing
designed to induce the employer to recognize a minority union as the em-
ployees' exclusive bargaining agent and that this in effect would "restrain
or coerce" a majority of the employees in the exercise of their rights under
§ 7 of the National Labor Relations Act [hereafter, NLRAJ, as amended. 2
By a six to three decision,3 the Supreme Court, in reversing the NLRB
held that peaceful picketing by a minority union to compel recognition as the
employees' exclusive bargaining agent did not constitute an unfair labor
practice as defined by § 8(b) (1) (A).4 More specifically, the Court held
I § 8(b) (1) (A) of the NLRB as amended provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents---(1) to restrain or coerce-(A) employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ... " 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1) (A).
2 § 7, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act provides: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)." 49
Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
3 Justices Stewart, Frankfurter and Whittaker would have remanded to the Board
without reaching the issue in that new § 8(b) (7) of the NLRA as amended by the
1959 Landrum-Griffin Act would have prohibited the activity since a company election
had been held within the past 12 months. Infra note 7.
4 The Court relied to a great extent on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act and in particular on Senator Taft's following comment on § 8(b) (1) (A): "I can
see nothing in the pending measure which, as suggested by the Senator from Oregon
(Morse), would in some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees.
It would not outlaw anyone striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent any-
one using the strike in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing or employing
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that the activity did not amount to restraint or coercion of employees in
the exercise of their rights under § 7.
Prior to their ruling in Curtis [popular name of the noted case] the
Board had been consistent in holding that § 8(b) (1) (A) was not applicable
to peaceful recognitional picketing unless there had been a direct inter-
ference with employees' rights under § 7.r In the interim between the orig-
inal Curtis ruling and the Supreme Court's reversal, the Board followed
Curtis in all cases of peaceful recognitional picketing by minority unions.6
The Supreme Court's decision proscribes the Board's past interpretation,
however, and should have a "braking" effect on the future administration
of § 8. The unions are thereby assured that the economic power of the
picket line will be subject to less interference from the NLRB. This power
can be abused, however, should a minority union use it to compel an em-
ployer to inflict upon the majority of his employees an "unwanted" union
to act as their exclusive bargaining agent. It was this possibility that led
Congress to amend § 8 of the NLRA by a provision in the new Landrum-
Griffin Act which prohibits picketing where, (1) an employer has legally
recognized another union, (2) an NLRB election has been held among the
employees within the past 12 months, or (3) a petition for a company
election is not filed within 30 days from the time the picketing began.7
This section, however, does not seem to completely close the gap created by
the judiciary's reduced scope of § 8(b) (1) (A).
In reversing Curtis, the Court gave further effect to its decision by
holding that peaceful picketing not expressly prohibited by §§ 8(b) (1) (A)
persuasion, all it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would
prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to work." 93 Cong. Rec. 4436
(May 2, 1947).
5 See e.g.: District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953);
Painters Dist. Council No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951); Medford Bldg. and Const. Trades
Council, 96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951); United Const. Workers, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951);
Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950); Clara Val Packing Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949); Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 80 N.L.R.B.
533 (1948); Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948); National Maritime Union of
America, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1947).
0 See e.g.: Sierra Furniture Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1198 (1959); Machinery Overhaul Co.
Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1958); Ailing & Cory Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 315 (1959); Biltmore
Furniture Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1728 (1958); Andrew Brown Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
1425 (1958); H. A. Rider & Sons, 120 N.L.R.B. 1577 (1958); Harou, Inc. & En Tour,
120 N.L.R.B. 659 (1958); Fisk & Mason, 120 N.L.R.B. 135 (1958); Ruffalo's Trucking
Service, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1958); Shepherd Machinery Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 320
(1957).
7 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C.
J 158(b) (7).
8 § 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
xight to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 61 Stat. 151,
29 U.S.C. § 163, 29 U.S.C.A. § 163. Picketing has been equated with striking for the
purpose of § 13. See e.g.: NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951).
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or 8(b) (7) is in fact protected by § 13.8 The opinion provides as follows:
"Therefore, since the Board's order in this case against peaceful picketing
would obviously 'impede' the right to strike, it can only be sustained if such
power is specifically provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act, that is in
§ 8(b) (1) (A)." It is of particular importance that the Court recognized the
activity in this case as being "protected" rather than merely unprohibited.
Protected activity remains within the exclusive scope of federal power where-
as unprohibited activity might not. Therefore, since federal jurisdiction over
peaceful picketing is plenary to the federal power derived from the "com-
merce clause, ' 9 the protection afforded by § 13 will prevail against con-
flicting state action wherever the NLRB acquires jurisdiction over activity
affecting interstate commerce10
Consequently, just how far the Curtis decision will protect peaceful
picketing depends on the extent to which the pre-emption doctrine operates
to preclude state jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the pre-emption doctrine as
applied to peaceful picketing is not so clearly established as it may seem. Its
history has been a long series of case-by-case delineation resulting in some
rather surprising limitations." A striking example is the so-called "no man's
land" resulting from the pre-emption of state action where the Board had
refused to exert jurisdiction' 2 because of its "dollar volume" requirements. 13
9 U.S. Const. art. I § 8; see e.g. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
10 U.S. Const. art. VI § 2 provides: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof: and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Consti-
tution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
11 In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Court
establishes the following precepts: (1) State action is pre-empted whenever the activity
is clearly or arguably either prohibited or protected by the Act. (2) The preceding
question must be initially determined by the NLRB. (3) The pre-emption doctrine
applies to state damage remedies as well as injunctive relief.
12 A recent Ohio case serves as an example, Faxon Hills Construction Co. v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 109 Ohio App. 21, 10 Ohio Op. 2d
151 (1957). The employer, after the NLRB denied jurisdiction for failure to meet
the dollar volume requirements, obtained an injunction from the common pleas court.
The picketing union appealed on the grounds that the employer had introduced into
evidence the refusal of jurisdiction by the NLRB and therefore by his own admissions
had established the fact that he was engaged in interstate commerce. The appellate
court agreed and dismissed the action on the grounds that state action was pre-empted.
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed on the pre-emption issue but reversed on the grounds
that the employer's admission did not by itself establish the fact that interstate com-
merce was involved, 168 Ohio St. 497, 156 N.E.2d 32 (1958). On remand the injunction
was upheld, 109 Ohio App. 33, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 158 (1958).
13 On October 2, 1958, the Board announced its new jurisdictional standards which
modified somewhat its original proposal. Examples of the new standards are: Nonretail:
$50,000 outflow or inflow, direct or indirect; Retail concerns: $500,000 gross volume
of business; Public utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet standard 1 (nonretail);
Newspapers and communications systems: Radio, television, telegraph, and telephone:
1960]
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Fortunately, this problem has been corrected by a provision in § 701 of the
Landrum-Griffin Act which amends § 14(c) of the NLRA to allow states
to take jurisdiction whenever the Board expressly declines. 4
At the present time, the combined effects of the 1959 Garmon decision' 5
and the Landrum-Griffin Act appear to have modified the pre-emption doc-
trine so as to present three distinct categories in which states may take ac-
tion to restrain peaceful picketing which would otherwise be protected by
federal law as in Curtis: (1) where interstate commerce is not affected,
(2) where the Board has expressly ceded jurisdiction under § 10(a),16 or
(3) where the Board can take action but declines to do so because of its
own self-imposed jurisdictional requirements. 17
Although this may seem to answer the question as to when "protected"
activity will be vulnerable to conflicting state action, there remains one
additional consideration, i.e., which law must the states apply-state or
federal? As to category (1), it seems clear that state law will prevail since
the activity itself is not subject to federal law. As to category (2), the
statute makes it clear that state law will apply. In category (3), the statute
is silent on the question and as yet there are no court decisions in point. The
legislative history, however, seems to indicate that Congress clearly intended
that state law apply. The final form of the Landrum-Griffin Bill which ulti-
mately passed in both houses was a compromise reached by a joint confer-
ence of members of both the House and Senate.' 8 The Joint Conference was
$100,000 gross volume. Newspapers: $200,000 gross volume; National defense: sub-
stantial impact on national defense.
14 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 541, 29
U.S.C. § 164. New § 14(c) (2) provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to pre-
vent or bar any agency or the court of any State or Territory . . . , from assuming
and asserting jurisdiction over labor dispute over which the Board declines pursuant
to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction."
15 Supra note 11.
16 § 10(a) of the NLRA as amended provides: "The Board is empowered, as
hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice . . .affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise: Provided, that the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry...
even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provisions
of the State of Territorial Statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such
agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a
construction inconsistent therewith."
17 However § 701 of the Landrum-Griffin Bill provides that the Board shall not
decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert juris-
diction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
18 The text of the Conference Report regarding § 701 reads as follows: "The
Senate bill provision relating to this subject amends the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, so as to provide that nothing in that act could be construed to prevent
any State or Territorial agency, other than a court, from exercising jurisdiction over
all cases over which the Board has jurisdiction, but by rule or otherwise has declined
to assert jurisdiction provided the State or Territorial agency applies and is governed
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called when the House refused to accept the bill as passed by the Senate
and one major point of disagreement was a provision in the Senate bill which
specified that state courts apply federal law. The bill as adopted by the Joint
Conference incorporated most of the provisions of the House bill and in the
Senate debates before final passage, two key conferees, Senators Goldwater
and Kennedy, made conclusive remarks in regard to the federal-state juris-
diction problem. Senator Goldwater commented as follows:
The House provision which was agreed to by the conferees
specifically carries out the recommendation of the McClellan Com-
mittee by authorizing state labor boards and courts to assume
jurisdiction and apply state law in cases over which the NLRB
declines to assert jurisdiction.' 9
Senator Kennedy commented: "... . it was agreed that state law could pre-
vail, but only in those areas in which the NLRB does not now assume
jurisdiction. 20
Thus it seems clear that state law will apply in all 3 categories men-
tioned above and that the Court's decision in Curtis will now affect only
those cases where the NLRB asserts positive jurisdiction.
In view of this extended scope of state jurisdiction over cases like
Curtis, the future of peaceful picketing seems to be in a quandary. In states
like Ohio which have no state labor board, picketing disputes are left en-
tirely to the equity jurisdiction of the courts. Consequently, the major con-
siderations affecting the decision will be the constitutional guarantees of
free speech on the one hand and the hardship on the employer and com-
munity interest in preserving the peaceful and unobstructed use of public
streets and sidewalks on the other.21 A balancing of these values will result
in an injunction much more frequently than in an NLRB case where a
solely by Federal law as set forth in sections 8(a) and 8(b) and section 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
The House amendment contains a provision which authorizes the Board, in its
discretion, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act to decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
any class or category of employers, where in the opinion of the Board, the effect of
such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The House amendment provides further that nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands) from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes
over which the Board in its discretion, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act declines to assert jurisdiction.
The substitute agreed upon in conference contains the House amendment with two
modifications. The first modification provides that the Board shall not decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959 . . . ." 105 Cong. Rec. 16539 (daily ed.
Sept. 3, 1959).
1) 105 Cong. Rec. A-8509 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
20 105 Cong. Rec. 16254 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
21 See e.g. Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214 (1955).
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major consideration is preserving fair relative bargaining positions between
labor and management. There is some justification for this disparity, how-
ever, in that the state's interest in preventing industrial strife and control-
ling the use of public streets and sidewalks is quite different from the in-
terest of the federal government in regulating and preserving the free flow
of commerce among the states.
Carl A. Rankin
